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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
majority reasoned that if the tenant were not liable to the landlord for the land-
lord's losses caused by a stay pending appeal, then tlhe language of section 1443
of the Civil Practice Act, insofar as it requires the posting of a bond to cover
damages where such a stay is obtained, would be meaningless. The majority
pointed out that if the tenant were liable only for the statutory rental and not the
fair rental value during the period in which a stay was granted pending appeal,
a tenant, merely by appealing and obtaining such a stay of the warrant, would be
able to "elevate himself by lifting his own bootstraps."
Judge Burke, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, contended that the statutory
tenancy continues until the issuance of the dispossess warrant, and that in any
event, a tenant in possession by permission of the Court does not incur the
liability of a trespasser. He argued that the majority decision, in allowing this
cause of action, inhibits the process of appeal in these cases, and is therefore
against the spirit of the Legislature's intentions. He suggested that the landlord's
proper recourse was to have the statutory rental increased as prescribed by the
statute.
There are three possible alternative solutions to this situation. First, the
tenant could be evicted after the entry of the dispossess order though appeal is
pending, but this is so impractical that neither litigant would suggest it. Second,
the tenant could be allowed to stay in possession after the entry of the dispossess
order, being liable only for the artificially low .statutory rental. Third, the tenant
could be allowed to stay in possession, by permission of the Court, after entry of
the dispossess order pending appeal, but liable in damages as a trespasser should
he lose on appeal This third approach forces the tenant to appeal at his own
risk, and not at the risk of the landlord. Therefore it not only precludes a
disgruntled tenant from utilizing an appeal to perpetuate the statutory rental
after the trial court has held him liable for the higher fair rental value, but also,
by allowing the tenant to appeal only at his own risk, inhibits the encumbering of
the courts with bad-faith appeals.
Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment-Payment of Rent Condition Precedent
to Suit by Tenant
In Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,20 the tenant brought an action
for damages against his landlord for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment Under
the lease, the covenant of quiet enjoyment was predicated upon the payment of
rent. In November 1955, the tenant was in default in his rent; the landlord in
the same month began alterations which the tenant alleged constituted a partial
actual eviction. The Court held that the action could not be maintained.
20. 4 N.Y.2d 117, 17 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958). "
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It is well settled that where the covenant of quiet enjoyment is expressly
conditioned upon the tenant's payment of rent and his performance of the obliga-
tions of the lease, his failure to pay such rent or perform such obligations is a bar
to the maintenance of any action upon the covenant for interference with the
quiet enjoyment of the premises, this is true whether the tenant's claim of a breach
of the covenant is based on an actual21 or a constructive eviction.22 The Court
also pointed out that section 234 of the Real Property Law 23 was not only not
retroactive,24 but also that the plain m.2aning of the statute does not suggest that
the covenant of quiet enjoyment may not be conditioned upon the performance
by the tenant of his covenants in the lease.
Tax Sale-Statute of Limitations for Seffing Aside
The statute of limitations for tax deed conveyances is presently but tempo-
rarily found in Tax Law sections 131 and 13225 They provide in pertinent part
that after two years from the date of the record of a tax sale conveyance, the
presumption of regularity of the sale and all proceedings prior thereto shall
become conclusive. Section 132 further provides all such conveyances and pro-
ceedings shall be subject to cancellation within five years from the last date of
redemption by reason of three situational defects, one of which is any defect in
the proceedings affecting the jurisdiction upon constitutional grounds.
In Kiamesha Dev. Corp. v. Guild Properties, Inc.,26 the plaintiff owner
brought this action to cancel a tax deed conveyance to the defendant purchaser,
by reason of a jurisdictional defect, two years after the deed recording but before
five years from the last date of redemption. The Appellate Division decided that
the two year provision of these statutes barred the instant action even if the
defects shown here were jurisdictional. The court relied on a statement in Werking
v. Amity Estates,27 which was construed as meaning that jurisdictional defects as
well as mere irregularities were bound by the two year period. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that their statement in Werking was misinterpreted and
so construed would completely nullify the intention of section 132 which explicitly
allows for cancellation within five years by reason of jurisdictional defects.
21. Silken v. Farrel, 306 N.Y. 585, 115 N.E. 827 (1953).
22. Baitzel v. Rhinelander, 179 App.Div. 735, 167 N.Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dep't
1917); Meyer v. Schulte, 160 App.Div. 236, 144 N.Y. Supp. 1023 (1st Dep't 1913).
23. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §234 provides:
Every covenant, agreement . . . exempting the lessor from
liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused
by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor .'.. shall be
deemed to be void as against public policy.
24. Weiler v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 284 N.Y. 630, 29 N.E.2d 938 (1940).
25. N. Y. TAX LAw §§131 and 132 have been repealed. Now see §§1018 and
1020 of the REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, effective October 1, 1959.
26. 4 N.Y.2d 378, 175 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1958).
27. 2 N.Y.2d 43, 155 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
